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I t seems there are two types of international lawyers-those who view apparent legal voids as vacuums to be filled by international law and those who view legal 
voids as barriers to the operation of international law. Voids. and for that matter 
ambiguity, provoke different reactions from diffe rent international lawyers. How 
an international lawyer or tribunal regards an apparent legal void may be, to bor-
row a poker term, one of the great international law "tells." In addition to provid-
ing doctrinal or descriptive darity, resolutions of voids usually expose a lawyer's 
level of confidence in the international legal system as well as his or her outlook on 
the propriety of sovereignty-based regulation. 
Disagreement over the significance of international legal voids is not merely ac-
ademic. To the contrary, debate over perceived or real legal voids between inter-
national law interpretive camps quickly brings questions of abstract legal theory 
into the practical worlds of international policy and practice. Even the hardened 
international- rule skeptic must see that States' conceptions of international law 
translate almost directly into policy. I With respect to the international law of war, 
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such interpretations can produce widespread life-or-death consequences and, 
with the rebirth of international criminal law, severe criminal sanctions. 
Legal voids exist and operate nowhere more clearly and widely in international 
law than in the laws of war applicable to non-international armed conflicts 
(NIACs), understood classically as civil wars.2 In purely quantitative terms, the 
positive law ofNlAC pales in comparison to the law-of-war provisions applicable 
to conflicts between States.3 For example, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, including 
their 1977 updates, contain well over five hundred substantive articles applicable 
to international armed conflict (lAC)~ yet fewer than thirty applicable to NIAC 
There is thus no small irony in the fact that the modern law of war actually traces 
its beginning to a document created to regulate conduct in a civil war. S Yet ever 
since, States have rejected invitations and proposals to level the positive legal gap 
between lAC and NlAC. The resu1t has been what some regard as glaring legal 
voids regarding the latter.6 
Status of government actors in NIAC provides an intriguing and specific exam-
ple of just such a void. Whereas the protections and obligations of the law of lAC 
are premised almost entirely on the status of affected persons, the law of NlAC 
spurns such classifications, as well as the lAC taxonomy of status-based protection 
generally. International lawyers have long regarded status of persons as largely ir-
relevant to NIAC.1 Yet modern forms of conflict and State responses may soon 
place pressure on the NlACstatus void. Increasing media attention, growing inter-
national oversight and progressively heightening sensitivity to the suffering pro-
duced by NlAC conspire to match the legal protective regime ofNlAC with that of 
lAC, including perhaps the latter's use of status. 
Status in lAC describes a number of circwnstances and legal relationships (e.g., 
wounded, wounded at sea, prisoner-of-war, or civilian status). This chapter 
focuses on the use of status to determine lawfulness of participation in hostilities, 
or what is sometimes referred to in lAC as combatant status.s ln particular, this 
chapter explores the extent to which the international law ofNIAC regulates the 
status of persons who participate in hostilities on behalf of the State. 
This chapter begins by addressing the descriptive question whether the interna-
tionallaw ofNlAC speaks to government forces' status at all. An analytical section 
accompanies, offering explanations of the likely influences behind the state of the 
law. A predictive effort follows, addressed to the question whether the law is set-
tled or instead like1y to change. This section identifies a number of pressures con-
spiring to fill the NIAC status void. An argument in favor of imposing status-like 
limitations on government forces in NlAC is derived from the law-of-war principle 
of distinction, and then rebutted by logical, structural and operational arguments. 
The chapter concludes by addressing a series of considerations related to the chapter's 
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opening generalization about international legal voids as an opportunity to reflect 
more deliberately on an appropriate interpretive approach to the law ofNIAC. 
The International Legal Status of Government Forces in NIAC 
The law of war is riddled with categories--<ategories of conflicts,9 categories of 
weapons,IO categories of persons. With respect to persons, the primary byproduct 
of these categories is an elaborate system of status for individuals participating, or 
caught up, in armed conflict. Principled application of the law requires a deep un-
derstanding of how the law of war employs status.11 Just as the law of war confers 
status to implement its humanitarian goals, the law's denial of status often pro-
duces disappointing or even inhumane results. Frequently, the complexities and 
nuances of status seem to frus trate alignment oflegally correct outcomes with in-
tuitively moral or normatively desirable outcomes. A great many of the present and 
past errors in the application of the law of war are attributable either to fail ure to 
understand how status attaches and operates in armed conflict or simply to unwill-
ingness to accept the practical consequences of correct status determinations. 12 
In war between States, status plays out primarily in the allocation of the 
protections and obligations of the law of war. Nearly every important protection of 
the law of lAC requires a predicate detennination of the status of persons seeking 
protection. l1 A prominent commentator observed with respect to lAC, "Every per-
son in enemy hands must have some status under international law ... ; nobody in 
enemy hands can be outside the law."14 In most cases, protection from intentional 
targeting requires the status of civilian,ls that of wounded person l6 or, generally, 
that of hors de combat. Persons qualifying for wounded or civilian status receive 
protection from attack "unless and for such time as they take direct part in 
hostilities."11 To benefit from the most elaborate law-of-war treatment obliga-
tions, persons in the hands of an adversary must qualify for wounded and sick,18 
prisoner-of-warI9 or protected-person status.20 The 1949 Geneva Convention on 
Civilians includes subcategories of civilian, including the "populations of countries 
in conflict,"21 "nationa1[sl of neutral state[s],,22 and "interned protected per-
sons. "23 The law further classifies members of the armed forces into subcategories 
of combatant and non-combatant.24 
In addition to allocating protection, the law of war uses status to deny protec-
tion and treatment obligations. Designation as a spy, mercenary, or, somewhat 
more controversially, an unprivileged belligerent, unlawful combatant, saboteur 
or guerilla can greatly reduce or alter a person's protection or treatment under the 
law ofwar.25 Status has been the focus of not only operational, humanitarian and 
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academic attention but also some of the most significant criminal litigation to en-
force the law of war. 26 
The law ofNlAC, however, stands generally as an exception to law-of-war reli-
ance on status. Whereas the legal regime applicable to lAC is replete with categories 
of status, no such system or taxonomy operates in the law ofNlAC The traditional 
response to the question whether international law regulates status in NIAC has 
been a confident no.27 While Additional Protocol II of 1977, the most developed 
treaty law applicable in NIAC, speaks in terms of a "civilian population," it offers 
neither qualifying criteria nor any definition of the term "civilian. "2$ Perhaps more 
significantly, the Protocol offers no counterpart to civilian status such as the Addi-
tional Protocol I status of combatant.29 
To the uninitiated, the most noticeable legal void ofNlAC might be the absence 
of prisoner-of-war status . Along with protection of the wounded and sick, 
prisoner-of-war status has long been one of the consummate law-of-war topics.30 
Few of the major law-of-war treaties addressed to the protection of victims of 
armed conflict have failed to address prisoners of war. While treatment provi-
sions and living conditions of the captured garner the lion's share of popular at-
tention, the most important aspect of prisoner-of-war protection has been 
immunity from prosecution for lawful hostile acts-so-called combatant immu-
nity. Combatant immunity protects most prisoners of war from prosecution by 
their captors for mere participation in hostilities.3l Thus, nearly alllaw-of-war 
prosecutions of prisoners of war have concerned the manner in which they con-
ducted hostilities rather than the fact of their participation in war or their other-
wise lawful, warlike acts. 
Fighters32 captured in NIAC do not share the status, immunity or regime of 
treatment obligations afforded to their lAC counterparts.H Despite development 
of a separate protocol dedicated to developing humanitarian protection in NIAC, 
the law of war affords no prisoner-of-war status in NIAC34 States' desire to avoid 
attachment of status in NlAC is perhaps apparent in the Additional Protocol II label 
for the captured, "[pJersons whose liberty has been restricted."35 This is a strained 
label, even by international legal standards; it is likely States wished to avoid any 
implications of status or legitimacy arising from use of a term of art to describe de-
tention in NIAC The international law of NIAC affords captured fighters treat-
ment obligations no different from those applicable to the general, non-hostile 
population.36 Neither efforts to comply with criteria of conduct or appearance nor 
any offer of reciprocal observance of the law can compel recognition of prisoner-
of-war status by a captor during NIAC.37 Instead, opposition fighters captured in 
NIAC, no matter their appearances or conduct, are likely to be regarded as mere 
criminals, fully subject to the domestic penal regime of the territorial State.38 The 
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nearest comment Additional Protocol II offers on the topic of combatant immu-
nity is Article 6(5).39 However, this provision merely charges States to "endeavor" 
to grant amnesty to fighters. Amnesty is by no means an international lcgal obliga-
tion in NIAC Domestic law represents the far more relevant legal source for both 
treatment obligations and immunities if any arising from participation in NIAC 
The law ofNIAC is nearly silent. 
The NIAC status void is even more pronounced with respect to the status of 
government actors in NIAC Investigation reveals no treatment in relevant treaty 
law, nor any significant international custom or usage on the topic. The well-
known criteria used to evaluate combatant status in lAC appear nowhere in the 
positive law of NlAC40 And while some States' military manuals address NIAC, 
none of those reviewed acknowledges international legal input to government 
forces' status.4 ! Instead, most emphasize that the existing lawofNIAChas no effect 
on the legal status of the parties to the conflict.42 Finally, there is there no evidence 
of internationally based prosecutions of government actors for their mere partici-
pation in NlAC or based on the nature or composition of such forces. 
States thus appear to be free from international regulation of the status or 
nature of government actors they employ against rebels in NIAC Although States 
have created rules regulating the conduct of their forces in N1AC, no positive in-
ternational rules limit the nature of persons or organizations governments may 
employ in N1AC Nor does the law of NIAC provide any general status for such 
forces . In fact, government forces' status in NIAC generally can be said to consti-
tute one of the remaining voids of the international laws of war. Three explana-
tions for this void seem apparent: one practical, a second probable and a third 
speculative but possible. 
The most practical explanation may be that there has simply been little need . 
Government actors involved in NIAC have not looked to international law for the 
legitimacy of their participation or for their legal mandate to carry out acts that are 
essentially internal or non-international in character. Actions taken to defend the 
State from internal threats lie at the heart of sovereignty. Even the highly interna-
tionalized collective security system of the United Nations includes a barrier to 
outside intervention in internal conflicts.43 The nature and status of government 
forces used in NIAC has been an area dominated by municipal law. Responses to 
insurgency or rebellion, though typically of greater intensity than routine crime, 
remain essentially law enforcement operations."" 
There are lively debates concerning domestic legal status and participation in 
hostili ties-none more timely and relevant than the U.S. Title to-Title SO division 
of national security authority.4S Conceptions of U.S. domestic law might well re-
strict authority to engage in combat to the armed forces as organized under Title 10 
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of the United States Code. Although likely envisioned in extraterritorial contexts, 
debate also swirls around permissible roles for private security contractors (PSCs) 
in armed conflict. Episodes such as the Blackwater Nisoor Square shootings46 and 
other examples of excessive use of force by PSCs have fos tered efforts to restrain 
them from direct participation in hostilities.~ 1 Proposals to limit PSC activities ap-
pear to have gained momentum, notwithstanding the considerable economies that 
have developed around that corner of the military-industrial complex. Clearly, 
States may resort to domestic law to limit the activities of their agents in armed 
conflict. The question remains apart, however, from whether they have resorted or 
will resort to international law to do the same. 
To be certain , government actors may very well find themselves called to task 
for the international legality of specific conduct and means and methods used in 
combat.48 International criminal tribunals of the late twentieth and early twenty-
first centuries have developed the NIAC jus i" bello through extensive cases. Yet 
the legality of their mere participation in NIAC itself has not been addressed in 
any forum applying international law. 
A related fac tor contradicting indications of international legal treatment of sta-
tus may be that States have tended to use fo rces practically appropriate to the task, 
that is, armed forces. When the activities of opposition figh ters reach a scale or level 
of intensity sufficient to cross the threshold from mere banditry or r iot into armed 
conflict, resort by the government to the armed fo rces of the State becomes an ob-
vious, often necessary response. Indeed, forcing the State to resort to armed forces 
is often regarded as a condition precedent to classifying a situation as armed con-
fli ct in the first place.49 
By contrast, the prevailing view of the law of lAC seems to limit the types of 
forces States may employ as direct participants in hostilities while preserving the 
protections of the combatant class, most obviously prisoner-of-war status.soTo ex-
pect prisoner-of-war status for their forces upon capture, it is generally agreed that 
States must employ regular armed forces or their equivalent in direct hostilities.51 If 
this view is correct and ifone extends it by custom to NlAC then it's likely the case, 
as the late Louis Henkin might say, that most States are in compliance, most of the 
time.52 Thus the problem, if there is one at all, may frequently be preempted by 
supposed compliance. 
A second, highly probable explanation for why international law does not ex-
plicitly regulate status of government actors in NlAC concerns States' general atti-
tudes toward the relationship between international law and NIAC. States have 
steadfastly resisted creating parity between the law of lAC and that of NIAC. It is 
likely the absence of international law is simply a byproduct of States' general re-
luctance to commit to positive rules in NIAC. The reasons fo r this reluctance are by 
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now well known. Fear of conferring legitimacy on rebels, concerns over failure of 
reciprocal obselVance,53 fear of limiting operational freedom of action and fear of 
erecting obstacles to domestic prosecutions of persons who take up arms against 
the State have all driven States to resist expanding the law ofNIAC to match that of 
lAC States simply do not view opposition fighters in NIAC as legal equals. 
Equality of status between sanctioned combatants has long been bedrock of the 
international law ofIAC Indeed, equality before the law has been a distinguishing 
feature ofthe jus in bello, setting it apart from its law-of-war counterpart, the jus ad 
bellum. Yet no "equal application" principle operates in the present lawofNlACS-4 
Indeed, States conditioned their consent to what little positive law of NIAC exists 
on an explicit guarantee that legal status would form no part of the law. 55 The con-
cluding clause of Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Convention provides, 
"The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the 
Parties to the conflict. "56 
The point is made again when one looks to the law of lAC Even in its current, 
highly developed state, the law of lAC does not fully regulate the status of govern-
ment forces. The concept of combatant status has ancient law-of-war rootsY Yet 
the positive law does not directly address or commit to this area. The Third Geneva 
Convention does not address combatant status, or immunity for that matter, at 
all-surprising, perhaps, for a prisoner-of-war convention comprising over 130 
articles. 
Building on the Third Convention, Additional Protocol I of 1977 states that 
combatants "have the right to participate directly in hostilities" and is likely reflec-
tive of custom. Yet this commitment represents only a partial comment on the is-
sue of combatant status. For instance, the relevant article does not affirmatively 
indicate whether combatants' right to participate in hostilities is exclusive. Thus it 
is unclear whether international law actually proscribes or even regulates participa-
tion in hostilities by persons not qualifying as combatants. Most law-of-war ex-
perts might posit that the right is exclusive to combatants but the soundest view is 
that international law is merely silent on the matter of privilege with respect to 
civilians. The matter is not committed to international law whatsoever. It is left to 
State prerogative and hence to municipal law. Additional Protocol I, Article 51(3), 
which merely outlines the targeting consequences of civilian participation , is the 
most the law of lAC offers on the topic.S8 
Commentary indicates the Additional Protocol I drafters intended to codify and 
clarify international custom on the point of combatant privilege.59 Still, experts 
debate what exactly that article and the law of lAC do for combatants in terms of 
authority. Some describe international law of armed conflict (LOAC) asa source of 
authority to participate in hostilities-a combatant's privilege.60 Others disagree, 
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characterizing the article as merely immunity-insulation from prosecution-
rather than an affirmative grant of authority, a right or pennission.61 The better 
phrasing may be that the article merely prohibits prosecutions rather than consti-
tutes affirmative authority or positive sanction. Notwithstanding contrary inter-
pretations by the 2009 United States Congress and the mid-twentieth-century U.S. 
Supreme Court, the majority view is that the law of lAC does not concern itself 
with the question of criminal consequences for mere direct participation in 
hostilities.62 The best view is that lAC regulates combatant status only as an instru-
mentality-a means to effecting other ends, such as treatment upon capture or for 
purposes of contrast with persons protected from attack. 
The point fo r purposes of this chapter is that States' apparent reluctance to com-
mit combatant status fully to international law in lAC makes the prospect that they 
would do so in NIAC extremely unlikely. Nothing even approaching the partial 
coverage offered by Additional Protocol I appears in Additional Protocol II . Nor 
do any of the usual indicators of customary norms, such as military manuals or 
statements of opinio juris, indicate any State commitment of combatant status in 
NIAC to international law. 
A final and possible reason fo r NIAC's void concerning government actor legal 
status is lack of consensus. The details of how to treat NIAC have long split the 
authors of internationallaw.63 Balancing the competing interests of humanity and 
respect for sovereignty has bogged down nearly every law-of-war treaty diplomatic 
conference. But this balance has been particularly elusive with respect to NIAC 
Both Common Article 3 to the 1949 Conventions and Additional Protocol II 
proved to be especially contentious on topics as fundamental as the definition of 
military objective.64 Each instrument generated highly divisive fact ions at its re-
spective diplomatic conference.6s 
For example, the 1949 Geneva Conventions diplomatic conference generated a 
lengthy report on the scope of NIAC.66 Consensus that the Conventions would 
only operate in conflicts analogous to classic civil war required fifteen weeks of 
work and twenty-three meetings on NIAC,67 Later, at the diplomatic conference 
that produced the 1977 Additional Protocols, the scope of covered NIAC again 
proved contentious. Somewhat surprisingly, the majority of delegations appeared 
more concerned with contracting LOAC rather than expanding it to cover the en-
tire range of NlAC68 These delegations scored a partial victory in the compara-
tively stingy application provisions of Protocol II. It is generally agreed that 
Protocoill applies to a narrower class of conflicts than its 1949 counterpart, Common 
Article 3.69 Thus, while there may well be a faction of States who, given the opportu-
nity, would consent to international regu1ation of government forces' status in NlAC, 
they seem not to have garnered sufficien t support at major treaty conferences.70 
152 
Sean Watts 
In the final analysis it is overwhelmingly apparent that States have not made any 
clear commitment of the issue of government forces' status in NIAC to interna-
tionallaw. Considerations including lack of necessity, general reluctance to yield 
sovereignty over internal affairs and lack of consensus have all contributed to the 
NIAC legal void. Yet given evolving notions of the formation of international law, 
including the law of war, the staying power of this void may be in doubt. 
Pressures on the Existing NIAC Framework 
A host of developments call into question whether government actor status in 
NlAC will remain unregulated by international law. First, if, as argued above,'l 
States have previously evaded international regulation of the status of their forces 
in NIAC because they have largely conformed to what some regard as limits appli-
cable in lAC, this may not hold true much longer. It seems the threats posed by 
modern insurgencies and hostile non-State actors are steadily provoking more 
comprehensive responses from States than previously. Leveraging technology, so-
cial media and increasingly open borders, States appear to resort to a broader spec-
trum of national power to counter today's non-State actors. Modern strategy and 
tactics feature informational and economic elements of State power almost as 
prominently as more traditional military and diplomatic elements in countering 
current threats. n 
Although intelligence work has always played an important part in armed con-
fli ct, modern NIAC appears to place even greater emphasis on intelligence gather-
ing. Insurgencies and terrorist groups have frustrated many traditional intelligence 
collection practices by operating as diffuse networks rather than as rigid "com-
mand and control" organizations. To counter these adaptations, national intelli-
gence assets outside the Department of Defense appear to provide not just strategic 
and operational assessments but also tactical-level intelligence used in small-unit 
engagements. Civilian intelligence assets appear to provide tactical operators de-
tailed, constantly updated information on enemy locations and activities far more 
analogous to that provided by reconnaissance spotters and scouts than to the 
templated, prepackaged and static information previously provided.73 
The involvement of intelligence community actors in the recent operation 
against Osama bin Laden provoked not only questions concerning the lawfulness 
of the operation but interest in the status of the various actors and agencies 
involved. Reports indicate that in addition to special operations members, Cen-
tral lntelligence Agency personnel were deeply involved in preparations for and 
conduct of the raid.74 Defending the operation on PBS Newshour. the Director 
of the Central Intelligence Agency explained the mission as a so-called "'title 50' 
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operation, which is a covert operation. "7S Elaborating, the Director explained that 
he commanded the mission but that "the real commander" was the Commander 
of Joint Special Operations Command, a component of the armed forces.16 Al-
though his motives fo r the characterization were unclear, it would not be unrea-
sonable to detect some effort to fend off allegations that civilian participation in a 
military operation would have been illegal. Although agency lawyers might have 
later advised him otherwise, particularly given the non-international nature of 
the conflict with al-Qaeda,n the Director's response reveals at least intuitive or 
implied concern for the impact participation in hostilities might have on the status 
of his personnel. 
Similar intermingling of the missions and assets of the military and civilian 
intelligence communities is apparent in the growing use of aerial drones.78 Initially 
conceived as intelligence-gathering platforms, drones are now capable of carrying 
out highly lethal and destructive kinetic attacks.79 Reports indicate the U.S. armed 
forces are not the sole operators of the nation's arsenal oflethal drones.so Intelli-
gence organizations such as the Central Intelligence Agency own and "pilot" 
drones capable of attack operations, providing a compelling example of blurred 
lines between intelligence activities and conduct of hostilities. Moreover, the 
United States no longer holds a monopoly on lethal drone technology, if indeed it 
ever held one. States such as Israel, China and France are reported to possess lethal 
drones, broadening the scope of involved international actors.! l Although perhaps 
only now in its infancy, drone use has already provoked intense legal debate. The 
majority of debate currently concerns authority for States to use lethal force 
outside the traditional confines of battlefields.82 Yet strains of debate concerning 
the authority of non-military personnel to participate in hostilities are gaining 
momentum.83 
Further intermingling of government civilian and military communities is en-
visioned in emerging mid- and postwar nation-building doctrine. An outgrowth 
of admitted failures in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, stability operations seek 
to build government capacity either to hasten or to sustain transitions from war to 
peace.84 Stability operations emphasize "soft power" such as education, agricul-
tural, economic and humanitarian assistance to address the deeper causes of 
armed conflict. Consistent with popular notions of the "three-block war," stability 
operations may occur at the same time as, and very near, active hostilities.8s In 
2005, stability operations received a high-powered endorsement in the form of a 
Department of Defense directive.1I6 The directive instructed all U.S. commanders 
to give stability operations "priori ty comparable to combat operations."87 Yet the 
centerpiece of military stability operations doctrine is the conviction that the 
armed fo rces must perform only a supporting role. Stability operations envision 
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heavy, often lead-agency roles for civilian governmental organizations such as the 
U.S. Department of State, Department of}ustice and the U.S. Agency for Interna-
tional Development. sa While actual civilian agency participation has lagged be-
hind expectations, stability operations that intermingle civilian and military 
missions, particularly in complex or dynamic security environments, seem on the 
rise and likely to blur notions of participation in hostilities.89 
A final emerging field of warfare also illustrates the intermingling of agencies 
provoked by modern armed conflict. States increasingly recognize cyberspace as a 
critical domain of national security.90 Few steeped in this evolving form of conflict 
are unfamiliar with stories of empty legal formalism with respect to personnel in-
volved in cyber operations. Informal discussions of practices associated with State 
involvement in cyber operations frequently recall stories of the uniformed service 
member who clicks "$end" at the conclusion of a cyber operation otherwise pre-
pared, designed, scouted and executed exclusively by civilian personnel. Although 
off-the-record and susceptible to exaggeration, no doubt, the anecdote may be in-
dicative of both the extent of civilian participation in U.S. cyber operations up to 
and likely including the moment of attack, and ingrained or intuitive notions of 
what constitutes lawful civilian participation in hostili ties.91 
Second, as the armed conflict in Libya showed, a stronger international spot-
light shines on NIAC than previously. The legal character of the Libyan conflict is 
complex. It is dear that by February 2011, hostilities rose beyond mere riot and 
crossed the threshold for armed conflict, resulting in a NlAC for legal purposes. Yet 
not long afterward, international intervention on behalf of the rebels in mid-
March likely converted portions of the conflict into lAC for the legal purposes of 
participating States.92 Whether the situation devolved into two separate conflicts, 
an lAC between Libya and the NATO States conducting attacks on one hand, and a 
NlAC between the Libyan government and the rebels on the other, is debatable.9) 
The better view acknowledges each as a separate conflict, notwithstanding practi-
cal complications. Either way, media and social networking made the details of 
government reactions to civil disturbances and especially the rebel armed groups 
instantly public.94 Even the academic legal community responded, producing 
near-instantaneous analysis and reactions to the conflict.9) The information age 
appears to have ended the era when States could rely upon the internal nature of 
NlAC to shield the nature of their responses from public attention. One wonders 
whether the same can long be said with respect to international legal attention. 
Third, and finally, the rise of so-called transnational armed conflict may bring 
pressure on the government forces status void. "Transnational armed conflict" typi-
cally describes armed conflict between a State and non-State actors not confined to 
the State's own territOly.'~6 U.S. operations against al-Qaeda since 2001 are often 
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cited as an example of transnational armed contlict given their extension beyond 
the sites of the original 200 1 attacks to at least four continents. Although oflimited 
legal recognition and acceptance among law-of-war experts, transnational armed 
contlicts remain related to NlAC in their likely scope of international regulation. 
At present they remain, in the most important respect for purposes of conflict clas-
sification, non-international. That is, despite crossing international borders, trans-
national armed conflicts still do not pit two States directly against one another. 
Yet the b roader geographic and political scope of transnational armed conflicts 
may render increased input from international law attractive to important interna-
tional legal personalities. Transnational armed conflict greatly strains traditional 
terri torial or politically based claims of exclusive sovereign prerogative on the part 
of the government under attack. Classic, non-extraterritorial NlAC has relied 
greatly on traditional notions of territorial sovereignty to fend off international 
regulation. With their associated cross-border incursions and movements, 
transnational armed conflicts unmoor NIAC from many of its traditional claims to 
general freedom from international regulation. To be sure, the soundest approach 
looks for such regulation from the traditional sources of international law-the 
agreements and binding practices of States. But from a normative perspective, 
rights of non-intervention in internal affairs97 and insulation from international 
legal meddling seem significantly weaker in transnational armed conflict. 
The emerging forms of warfare showcased above reinforce the point. To return 
to cyber operations, it appears nearly impossible to conduct an effective, net-
worked cyber attack within the terri tory of one State.93 For instance, although of 
uncertain origin, the denial of service attacks suffered by Estonia in 2007 are esti-
mated to have transited servers and networks located in as many as 178 countries.9'l 
Cyber attacks are likely to appear attractive to non-State actors challenging better-
resourced government opponents in NIAC. lOO Cyber warfare offers insurgents 
anonymity, economy and access to destructive potential often difficult to acquire 
with respect to kinetic means. 101 To the extent cyber operations can be expected as 
a feature ofNIAC, these con tlicts will continue to involve transnational elements, 
such as attacks either originating from the territory of third-party States or at least 
transiting servers therein. Government responses to insurgent cyber attacks may 
be less than discriminating given the difficulties of cyber attribution. One can easily 
foresee false positives leading governments in NIAC to unwittingly attack assets of 
neutral third-party States. The temptation to resort to international law of war to 
regulate such events, to the extent they are not already regulated in the jus ad 
bellum and law of State responsibility, may be great. 
Ultimately, the effect of each of these phenomena of modern armed conflict-
mixing of traditional missions, increasingly available information on how States 
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conduct NIAC and the enlarged geographic scope ofNlAC-is likely to be height-
ened scrutiny of State responses to NIAC. If, as the prior section asserted, State re-
sponses have largely conformed to tradition, modern conflict's demand for 
interagency responses will likely involve actors not traditionally associated with 
direct participation in NlAC. If States could formerly rely on the fog of war and 
geographic borders to obscure the details of how and with whom they carried out 
military operations, the networked world will certainly make their practices and 
tactics apparent and subject to scrutiny. And if the previously internal nature of 
NIAC permitted States to defend claims of sovereign prerogative, the increasingly 
transnational nature ofNIAC will surely increase pressure to internationalize the 
applicable legal regime, perhaps even with respect to status. 
Re-examining Status in NIAC 
The extent to which one concludes the international law ofNIAC regulates the status 
and composition of government forces may be a function of the level oflegal gen-
erality at which one operates. As demonstrated above, the positivist claim to inter-
national regulation of the topic is weak. Certainly, no specific treaty provisions 
address the subject directly. Nor does one find extensive signs of State consent to 
international regulation of the topic through recitation of custom or li tigation gen-
erally. Yet drawing back to the level of principles, one might find evidence to un-
dermine the voids previously described. Paired with looser interpretive practices, 
such as giving tangible effect to the perceived objects and purposes of such legal 
norms, a colorable case for limits on government forces in NIAC emerges.I02 This 
section examines briefly the case for principle-derived international law limits on 
State participation in NlAC similar to the status-based limits found in lAC. 
The principle of distinction has been called "the grandfather of all principles" of 
the law of armed conflict.101 Enumerated alternately as "distinction"lG4 or "dis-
crimination," los in both practice and custom warriors have long recognized the 
principle. Distinction's first clear codification appeared in one of the founding 
documents of the law of armed conflict. The U.s. Lieber Instructions, drafted in 
1863, state: 
[AJs civilization has advanced during the last centuries, so has likewise steadily 
advanced, especially in war on land, the distinction between the private individual 
belonging to a hostile country and the hostile country itself, with its men in arms. The 
principle has been more and more acknowledged that the unarmed citizen is to be 
spared in person, property, and honor as much as theexigenciesofwar will admit. 106 
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The modern international law of armed conmct expresses the principle simi-
larly in Additional Protocol I, Article 48, titled appropriately "The Basic Rule. "I07 
Most frequently, distinction operates on the targeting practices of combatants, 
restricting lawful attacks to legitimate military objectives and enemy combatants 
and fighters. lOS Distinct ion fo rbids attacks on civilians not participating directly in 
hostilities and on civilian objects.I09 The principle also forbids attacks producing 
effects that cannot be contained or limited to their intended targets. IIO 
Beyond limiting attacks and their effects to lawful targets, distinction also com-
prises combatants' duty to distinguish t}[ernse/ves from civilians. Located among 
the Additional Protocol I provisions related to prisoner-of-war and combatan t 
statuses, Article 44 requires that combatants "distinguish themselves from the civil-
ian population while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation prepa-
ratory to an attack."lll Historically, combatants have satisfied this aspect of 
distinction by setting themselves apart from civilians both spatially and in appear-
ance. Uniforms and the practice of carrying arms openly, combined with tactics in-
volving tight fonnations and relatively confined battlefields, formerly made 
distinction a relatively simple matter. Recognizing modern practices of militia and 
other organized resistance movements in twentieth-century warfare, however, Ar-
ticle 44 pennits combatants to derogate from distinguishing themselves in the tra-
ditional manner in some insta nces. Under Article 44, in occupied territory and 
wars of national liberation, unconventional combatants need merely carry arms 
openly d uring and in preparation for attacks. l12 Relaxing the unifonn and insignia 
aspects of the distinction requirement, Article 44 proved one of the most conten-
tious provisions of Protocol I. II) Yet the general duty for participants in hostilities 
to distinguish themselves clearly during combat persists. 
Addressed more squarely to targeting operations than status, Additional Proto-
coli , Article 58 outlines precautions against attacks and reinforces the second as-
pect of the principle of distinction. II ~ Article 58 generally requires that parties 
remove or separate civilians located in their own territories from likely military 
objectives. Commentary to the rule clarifies its intent also to prevent construction 
of military buildings near civilian populations and objects. liS The rule's relation-
ship to distinction lies in its facilitation of attackers' efforts to obselVe the princi-
ple themselves. In some sense, Article 58 responds to critiques that the targeting 
provisions of Additional Protocol I focus too narrowly on attackers. lIt> Law-of-war 
experts have obselVed that in many targeting scenarios, the defender or object of 
attack is better positioned to limit civilian casualties and collateral damage to civil-
ian objects. 117 Though perhaps not to the entire satisfaction of Protocol I critics, 




Carried to its logical conclusion, the above conception of distinction, in both 
lAC and NlAC,II! can be understood to carry an implicit limitation on the catego-
ries of government actors authorized to take part in hostilities. In NlAC, govern-
ment use of agencies or actors indistinguishable from the civilian population or 
from government agencies not participating directly in hostilities frus trates insur-
gents' efforts to observe the principle of distinction in their attacks. For instance, 
co-location of an interagency intelligence analysis cell with other civilian agency 
assets not engaged in a NIAC effort might frustrate discriminate attacks on the for-
mer. More important, widespread use of personne1 from civilian government 
agencies to cond uct hostilities in NIAC could easily induce insurgent forces to re-
gard all civilian government personnel as hostile, even those not actually taking di-
rect part in attacks. 
As critics of Additional Protocol I observe, the defender, in this case the de jure 
government, is usually better positioned to prevent harm to civilians. Either by 
clearly identifying persons taking direct part in hostilities on behalf of the 
government or by restricting such activities to members of the armed forces, the 
government could greatly aid efforts to ensure discriminate attacks. Under the 
proposed principle-based rule, any contrary course of action would be character-
ized as inconsistent with the principle of distinction or at least inconsistent with 
its object and purpose. 
Such a rule might easily translate into a status-like conception for NlAC. Al-
though NlAC generally rejects the use of status to apportion authority and protec-
tion, a distinction-derived rule limiting participation in hostilities to members of 
the government armed forces might operate similarly to a status-based rule. In 
practical terms, the rule would create two categories of persons in NIAC: those 
whose direct participation does not frustrate the principle of distinction and those 
whose direct participation in hostilities violates the principle. Such bifurcations are 
entirely parallel to the status-based legal regime of lAC in important respects, lack-
ing only the familiar taxonomy of combatant and civilian. 
Finally, in addition to the rule's logical connection to the most important 
principle of the law of war, proponents might point to recent trends toward par-
ity between the international law of lAC and that ofNIAC. The very late twentieth 
and early twenty-first centuries have seen an expansion of international instru-
ments applicable in NlAC as well as extensions of existing lAC treaties into NIAC. 
Major treaties expanded to cover NIAC include the 1954 Hague Cultural Property 
Convention;119 the1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons, including its five 
protocols;120 the 1997 Ottawa Landmines Convention;121 the 1993 Chemical 
WeaponsConvention;122 and the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions. J2} Addi-
tionally, 11 8 States have ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
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Court, which includes a highly developed article of war crimes in NlAC124 Beyond 
application of the technical provisions of these treaties, such expansions might signal 
an important erosion of State hostili ty toward international regulation of the con-
duct of hostilities in NIAC 
In sum, attractive logical, humanitarian and even mildly positivist cases might 
be made for status-like limits on government forces participating in NIAC For 
purposes of argument, this section imagines a d istinction-derived rule that would, 
as some consider is the case in lAC, limit direct participation in hostilities in NlAC 
to armed forces or militia similarly organized and belonging to a party to the con-
fli ct.12S In fact, a recent book dedicated to the topic of combatant status in NIAC as-
serts as much, arguing, "By definition, any person who participates in an internal 
armed conflict who is not a member of the states' armed forces is an 'unlawful' 
combatant-that is, a person who is not immunized for their warlike acts."126 De-
spite apparent humanitarian payouts, the imagined rule runs afoul of important 
structural and technical facets of the law of war. Logical, structural and practical 
reasons counsel against recognition of the rule as lex lata and perhaps even as lex 
ferenda . 
First among logical objections, the distinction-derived rule proves too much. 
The logic of the proposed rule would extend to practically absurd conclusions. For 
example, the appearances of some non-military government actors in NIAC would 
not frustrate the principle of distinction . Many States' domestic security forces 
would appear to most observers as combatants. Few, if any, NIAC fighters could 
claim to have been misled by the uniforms, armaments and even vehicles used by 
such actors despite their non-military character. Yet because they are not actually 
armed forces or, alternatively, not subject to a system of command and internal 
discipline they would be excluded from conducting hostilities under the supposed 
rule. The same might easily be said of private security contractors employed by 
States in NIAC For all the complexities PSCs have introduced to the modern bat-
tlefield, confusion with innocent civilians is not typically among them.127 
Additionally, a blanket rule limiting government conduct of hostilities in NlAC 
to members of the armed forces would extend beyond situations that implicate the 
appearance of the hostile actor at all. So-called over-the-horizon or non-line-of-
sight attacks seem not to provoke concern that the attacker distinguish him- or her-
self through visual means. In this respect, there is great danger that the distinction-
derived rule would operate too broadly in a logical sense. That is, application of a 
rule requiring the wearing or display of distinctive insignia or uniforms applied to 
over-the-horizon warfare fails to serve the rule's intended purpose of facilitating 
the defender's efforts to distinguish attackers from innocent, non-hostile parties. 
Limiting the conduct of attacks to members of the armed fo rces in such 
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circumstances amounts at least to empty formalism-and at worst to absurdity-
hannful to the reputation and perceived legitimacy of the law of war. 
As related above, the material field of application of a number of important in-
ternational law-of-war instruments has recently been expanded to NlAC. By their 
terms, these treaties fonnerly regulated only lAC. Previously, their extension to 
NlAC could only be achieved by proof of customary status-a technique fraught 
with ambiguity and subject to vexing caveat. It may be, as previously observed, that 
these expansions reflect a reduction of State hostility to international regulation of 
NIAC. Yet closer examination suggests evidence of a more restrained enthusiasm 
for international regulation ofNIAC. 
With the notable exception of the Rome Statute, each of the treaties recently ex-
panded to cover NIAC concerns means and methods of warfare. They are primar-
ily weapons treaties consistent with the Hague tradition of the law of war.us 
Weapons treaties have long been an exception to the use of status to apportion pro-
tection in lAC. In contrast to the instruments of the so-called Geneva or "respect 
and protect" tradition, weapons treaties associated with the Hague tradition have 
operated universally, benefiting both combatants and civilians, though typically in 
a collateral sense with respect to the latter. Weapons treaties usually do not concern 
interpersonal interactions or the control of individuals and have not been a source 
of protected or privileged status under the law of war. None of the expanded trea-
ties introduces to NIAC a new or protected status. While certainly humanitarian 
advances and arguably a boon to the prospect of international regulation of NIAC, 
the recent expansions actually reflect no alternation whatsoever to the general 
dearth of status-based regulation in NlAC. The larger significance of these expan-
sions may not be general State willingness to submit to international regulation of 
NIAC, but rather recognition of the near-perfect alignment of concern for unnec-
essary suffering produced by certain classes of weapons in both lAC and NlAC. 
By contrast, the Rome Statute's significant NlAC jurisdictional grant to the In-
ternational Criminal Court (ICC) spans both traditions of the law of war. The 
NIAC-relevant portions of the Rome Statute undoubtedly represent a significant 
concession to the international legal system. And other international tribunals 
share the ICC's broad authority with respect to conduct in NIAC. I29 Yet the extent 
to which the mandates of these tribunals reflect willingness to commit NIAC to the 
international legal system should not be overstated. First, it should be remembered 
that the jurisdiction of the ICC, through the principle of complementarity, takes a 
backseat to domestic proceedings. no States willing and able to hear claims arising 
from participation in NIAC in their own courts preempt ICC jurisdiction. 
Complementarity stands as a powerful bar to international intrusion into NIAC. 
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Second, the most legally significant outcomes of the decisions at the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICfY) have been achieved 
only through controversially broad outlooks on the scope of customary law appli-
cable to NlAC. None is better illustrative than the IcrY decision in Prosecutor v. 
Tadii, in which the Appeals Chamber observed that the distinction between lAC 
and NIAC had lost much of its value and weight. 1l1 The Tribunal's observation is 
only defensible under the least rigorous conceptions of customary international 
law. Applied to the nationals of minor powers, involved in unquestionably inhu-
mane conduct, the Appeals Chamber's observation attracted only minor protest. 
One wonders whether applied to agents of more influential international actors, 
and to less obviously atrocious circumstances, the Chamber's bold pronounce-
ment would have weathered as well. 
Third, and most important, it should be understood that criminal tribunals deal 
with conduct, as distinct from status. For the tribunals, status is examined solely 
for the purposes of evaluating jurisdiction or determining whether charged con-
duct satisfies the elements of an enumerated offense. For instance, a tribunal vested 
with jurisdiction to hear grave breaches of the Third Geneva Convention must 
determine whether any alleged victims held the status of prisoner of war as under-
stood by that Convention.132 Similarly, grave breaches of the Fourth Convention 
require that purported victims be protected persons as defined by Article 4 of that 
Convention. m Criminal tribunals do not resolve questions of status for their own 
sake or for such inherently political purposes as determining the legitimacy of par-
ticipation itself. None of the tribunals has litigated status as such or at least in the 
sense applied by this chapter. Despite a rich jurisprudence concerning NlAC, no 
international case has examined status of any figh ter with respect to lawfulness of 
mere participation. Claims advancing a distinction-derived rule on government 
participation in hostilities in NIAC likely confuse conduct with status. 
The preceding argument illustrates a critical point, namely, the function of 
status. Status is instrumental; it is an intermediary fo r larger, more meaningful 
legal outcomes. Under the laws of war, status confers protection, treatment, obli-
gations and, in the case of combatants, a limited form of immunity from prosecu-
tion. While protection from hostilities, treatment standards upon capture and 
other obligations concerning handling of captured combatants share an essen-
tially humanitarian impetus, immunity remains an end distinct from the human-
itarian status-derived ends. Immunity is quintessentially political. Immunity 
from prosecution for participation in hostilities and the derivative rule limiting 
the classes of persons who may claim immunity lie at the heart of sovereignty. If 
status is conceived as a gateway to immunity, then it is true that in NlAC "status 
is the prize for which fighting is waged. "134 The suggestion, such as that advanced 
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by the distinction-derived rule on government forces in NIAC that States would 
surrender the ultimate prize of revolutionary war to the international legal sys-
tem, is severely at odds with both the historical experience of NIAC, and their 
clearest self-interest. In terms of logical argument, conceiving status in NIAC as a 
means to lawful participation begs the question of the conflict itself. Only if status 
is conceived as an instrumentality to purely humanitarian ends can it be fairly 
said to operate at all with respect to government forces in NIAC. 
From a still wider perspective, it is difficult to reconcile serious claims of lAC-
NIAC parity with the positivist record. I)S As emphasized above, States have consis-
tently, by compelling majorities, rebuffed invitations to drop the IAC-NIAC dis-
tinction in law-of-war treaties. 1)6 Even where States have consented to overlapping 
norms, they have made critical caveats. The Martens clause made an early appear-
ance in the Hague Conventions and has reappeared in nearly every major law-of-
war instrument since. An eponymous homage to an influential Russian diplomat, 
the clause first resolved an impasse of the treatment of resistance fighters during 
belligerent occupation by referring to the common law of war and to more general 
norms of humanitarian treatment. m Since then, the clause has served the function 
in treaties of holding a place for the customary law of war, and also as a sort of re-
sidual clause for the operation of peacetime humanitarian norms. 
While the clause appears in the NlAC-specific Additional Protocol II of 1977, it 
bears crucial alterations to its traditional form.138 The Protocol II iteration ex-
cludes reference to "law of nations"l"internationallaw" and "established cus-
tom."1)9 Also omitted is the traditional reference to "usages established among 
civilized peoples."I40 Academic commentary to Additional Protocol II indicates 
these were deliberate omissions, intended to honor States' historical re1uctance to 
commit NlAC to intemationallaw. 141 As is plain, each omission shares with the 
others reference to the international legal system. A clearer desire to keep interna-
tional norms at bay in NIAC is difficult to conjure. That States would in the 
modern period of positive law-of-war development require alterations to such a 
wide1y accepted and fundamental precept of the law of lAC certainly bears witness 
to the persistence of the IAC-NlAC divide. 
To be sure, some lAC norms transpose easily to NlAC. International tribunals 
and respected non-governmental and academic studies have made compelling 
cases to close the substantive legal gap between the two recognized conflict types. 142 
For instance, minimal treatment standards for persons in custody applicable in 
lAC present few, if any, NIAC-specific obstacles to military or political necessity. 
But even if many lAC norms transpose easily, status does not appear to be one of 
them. Although a certain parity between treatment obligations and protections in 
lAC and NIAC can be conceded, it is worth noting that status has not made the leap 
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between two conflict types. Conferral of status, even as a humanitarian instrumen-
tality, has proved the point where State willingness to level the law of lAC and that 
of NlAC ends. The issue remains of sufficient political importance to NIAC to 
withstand even the considerable aforementioned pressures on the existing NlAC 
status void. 
Finally, and aside from descriptive debates, calls for leveling the international 
law of NIAC with that of lAC fail to make the normative case that international 
law is the best answer to perceived problems in NlAC. Typically claims that lAC 
norms have migrated to NlAC appeal to strong humanitarian logic. How could 
persons, especially victims of hostilities, be less deserving of protection simply by 
virtue of conflict classification? While compelling on some levels, these claims fail 
to appreciate the entire calculus of commitment of an issue to the international 
legal system. Commitments to international law reflect not only normatively de-
sirable outcomes, but also the judgment of States that such outcomes are best 
achieved collectively rather than independently. No single theory ofinternational 
law prescribes a comprehensive formula for such determinations. States appear to 
make such determinations on an ad hoc basis, balancing multiple and dynamic 
variables. 
Since the late nineteenth century, States have judged international law as a good 
fit fo r international armed conflict largely by virtue of the identities of the actors. 
Coincidence of interests and guarantees of reciprocity continue to inform the in-
ternational bargains struck through treaties. By definition, the parties to NlAC up-
set the logic of this prescription. Assumptions concerning capacity and willingness 
to observe internationally based legal obligations do not migrate from lAC to 
NlAC as easily as rules themselves. Moreover, domestic legal systems' implementa-
tions of international law are often imperfect. Legal nuances are often lost in trans-
lation, frustrating expectations of uniformity and universality. Hard-won bargains 
at diplomatic conferences may be selectively or not at all implemented. Consider-
ing the inherently internal, sovereign nature of issues in NIAC, the likelihood that 
international norms would be implemented to the credit of international law legit-
imacy seems dim. Finally, modern perceptions of the laws of war themselves may 
be part of the problem. Characterizations of the law of war as exclusively humani-
tarian mislead and present an incomplete picture of its true object and purpose.143 
While many of the humanitarian aspects of the law of lAC have proved well dis-
posed to migration to NlAC, the use of status generally, and particularly to appor-
tion political outcomes such as immunity, appears to be the current limit of State 




As the chapter's opening assertion, a gross generalization to be sure, suggests, in-
ternationallawyers' reactions to purported voids in international law coverage 
vary greatly according to interpretive preferences and general outlooks on inter-
national law. Whatever one's interpretive bent, it seems undeniable that positive 
voids in international law no longer mean what they used to. Substantive gaps in 
treaty coverage seem to represent neither the end of descriptive debate, nor the 
beginning of the end, but only perhaps the end of the beginning of such discus-
sions. l44 In addition to the possibilities of international custom, theories accept-
ing a proliferation of "international lawmakers" now include suggestions that 
non-State actors might form international law, greatly increasing the likelihood 
that perceived voids will be filled to the satisfaction of interpretivist schools of 
thoUght. 14S The signs are all around that if the NIAC status void is to remain in ef-
fect it will have to be defended rather than assumed. 
With respect to the status of government forces in NlAC a distinction-derived 
rule limiting government forces' participation in hostilities explored in this chapter 
is more than a rhetorical straw man. Accepting evolution in NIAC, the prospect of 
international regulation appears highly possible. In addition to changes in interna-
tionallaw interpretive theory, evolutions in State military doctrine applicable to 
NlAC and increased popular attention tohow NIAC is waged by States provide fer-
tile ground for transplanting lAC nonns into NIAC. 
Despite their shortcomings, jus in bello treaties have been highly successful at 
humanizing lAC. The desire to import such success to NlAC is both laudable and 
understandable. Yet voids are not in all cases invitations to interpretive gap-filling. 
Voids are, as in the case of status in NlAC, often reflections of States' general out-
look on the propriety and likely efficacy of international regulation. To preserve 
the legitimacy of the law of war generally, a sound and principled methodology is 
needed to regulate the migration of norms from lAC to NIAC. 
It may be fair to say the jus in bello is under-theorized and thus not up to the task. 
Compared to domestic legal regimes, international law generally and even its legal 
sibling the jlls ad bellum, the law governing the conduct of hostilities lacks a delib-
erate and well-defended interpretive theory. One finds far greater attention to 
compliance theory in jus ad bellum than jus in bello. l46 That law-of-war specialists 
haven't paid particular attention to interpretive theory is to some extent forgivable. 
The pressing practicalities of its relevance, the life-and-death implications of its 
operation, and the still unsorted doctrinal and descriptive challenges are enough to 
occupy a career. However, in addition to the possibility of resolving a pressing 
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doctrinal question, the NIAC status void may offer an opportunity to spark more 
deliberate discussion of interpretive theory in the jus it! bello. 
The temptation to address voids from a purely humanitarian perspective can be 
great. Yet purely moral reasoning fails to account for the current positive dispari-
ties between the law of lAC and that of NlAC. Ultimately, deliberate and p rincipled 
interpretive efforts, such as this chapter has endeavored to provide, present the 
more promising course, unveiling areas of potential progress, while sustaining the 
underlying logic and nature of the current international legal system. 
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highly infonned and principled application of protected-person status under the Fourth Geneva 
Convention) {hereinafter Pro~cutor v. Tadic1. 
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13. The most significant exception to the status-dependent intemationallaw of war is the 
category of rules limiting weapons and means of warfare, the so-called Hague tradition. See infra 
text accompanying note 128. 
14. COMMENTARY IV GENEVA CONVENTION REUTIVE TO THE PROTECfION OF ClVIUAN 
PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 51 (Jean S. Pictet I'd., 1958) [hereinafter GENEVA CONVENTION IV 
COMMENTARY] . 
15. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, arts. 48-71. 
16. See 1949 Geneva Convention I, supra note 3, arts. 12-13 (outlining, respectively, 
protections owed to the wounded and qualification criteria for the status of wounded). 
17. Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art . 51(3). A recent symposium offers a helpful 
cross-section of views on the meaning of this phrase. Forum, Direct Participation in Hostilities: 
Perspectives on the IGRG Interpretive Guidance, 42 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POUTICS 637 (2010) . Article 13 of Addi tional Protocol II applicable 
to NlAC replica tes Article 51 (3), although without an accompanying definition of the term 
"[cJivilians.» Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 10 
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 5, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional PrOlocol ll]. 
18. See 1949 Geneva Convention I, supra note 3, art . 13. 
19. See 1949 Geneva Convention III , supra nOlI' 3, art. 4. See also YORAM DINSTEIN, THE 
CONDUCT OF HOSTIllTIFS UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFUCT 39-51 (2d 
I'd. 20 10) (providing a clear application of the prisoner-of-war qualification criteria); Memoran· 
dum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Office of Counsel to the President, to 
George W. Bush, President of the Uni ted Siales, Decision re Application of the Geneva Conven· 
tion on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with AI Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002), reprinted 
in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 2, at 118, 121 (offering a controversial application o f the 
prisoner-of. war criteria). Reinforcing the importance of prisoner·of-war status, the Third 
Geneva Convention requires detaining powers convene "competent tribunals» to determine the 
proper status of detainees potentially eligible for protection under the Convention. See 1949 
Geneva Convention Ill, supra, art. 55. 
20. See 1949 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 3, art. 4. See also Derek Jinks, The Declining 
SignijicQllceofP.O.W. Sratus, 45 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAl 367 (2004) (explain. 
ing the nature of the Fourth Convention's protective regime); Knut D~rmann, The Ugal Situa-
tion orUnlawfullUnprivileged Combatants, »85 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 45 
(2003) (explaining d early the application of qualifying criteria for Fo urth Convention protected 
persons status) . 
21. 1949 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 3, art. 13. The "whole of the populations of the 
countries in conflict" receives the protections of Part II of the Fourth Convention. Id. Part II pro· 
tects access to medical treatment as well as shelter from the effects of host iii lies through hospi tal 
and safety zones. Id., arts. 14-26. 
22. Id., art. 4. The Fourth Convention leaves protection of nationals of neutral States largely 
to the diplomatic system. See GENEVA CONVENTION IV COMMENTARY, supra note 14, at 48. 
23. 1949 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 3, arts. 7S-79. The Fourth Convention pre· 
scribes a detailed regime of treatment obligations for inlerned protected persons in ParI IV. [d., 
arts. 79-14l. 
24. Regulalions Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art . 3, annexed to Con· 
vention No. IV Respecting the Laws and CUSIOms of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, I 
Bevans 631 (distinguishing, wi thin the anned fo rces, combatants from non-combatants such as 
chaplains and medical personnel) [hereinafter 19()7 Hague Convention IVJ. 
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25. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, arts. 46-47; Richard R. Baxter, So-Called 
"Unprivileged Belligerency~: Spies, Guerrillas, and Saboteurs, 28 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAw 323 ( 1951 ). The staM of unprivileged belligerent or unlawful combatant 
has provoked significant legal debate. A strong textual case can be made that no such separate, 
treaty.based status exists. See Mark Maxwell & Sean Watts, Unlawful Enemy Combatant: Status, 
Theory of Culpability, or Neither?, JOURNAl OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 19 (2007) 
(concluding U.S. use of the term " un1awful enemy combatant~ reflects legal convenience more 
than objective assessment of the existing laws and customs of war); DOrmann, supra note 20, at 
46-47 (emphasizing that neither term appears in the 1949 Geneva Conventions). But su 
DINSTEIN, supra note 19, at 33-36 (defending, in one of the most respected texts on the jus in 
btllo, recogni tion of the class of unlawfu1 combatant). 
26. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadif, supra note 12, '" 164-69 (announcing surprising legal find· 
ings on Fourth Geneva Convention protected. person status). 
27. See UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAw OF ARMED 
CONFLlcr , 15.6.1 (2004) (stating, "The law relating to internal anned conflict does not deal spe· 
cifically with combatant status or membership of the anned forces") (hereinafter UK LOAC 
MANUAL]; SOLIS, supra note 4, at 191 (observing, "[Tj here are no 'combatants,' lawful or other-
wise, in Common Article 3 conflicts~). 
28. Additional Protocol II, supra note 17, art. 5. 
29. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 4 , art. 43(2) (stating, "Members of the anned 
forces of a Party to a conflict . .. are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to participate 
directly in hostilities~) (parenthetical omitted). 
30. Codified protection of prisoners and the status of prisoner of war date back to some 
of the earliest multilaterallaw-of-war ins truments. See Lieber Code, supra note 5, arts. 53-
56; PRO/ECf OF AN INTERNATIONAL DECL\RATION CONCERNING THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS 
OF WAR arts. 23-34 (Aug. 27, 1874), availilble at http://www.icrc.orglihLnsf/INTRO/135 
?OpenDocumentj Institute ofInternational Law, Oxford Manual 1880: The Laws of War on Land, 
reprinted in Schindler &Toman, supra note 5, at 29, arts. 61-72; Hague Convention (II ) Respect· 
ing the Laws and Customs of War on Land with Annex of Regulations arts. 4-20, July 29, 1899, 
32 Stat. 1803, I Bevans 247 [hereinafter 1899 Hague Convention II ]. 
31. Not all prisoners of war enjoy combatant immunity. For instance, while "warcorrespon. 
dents, supply contractors, and membersoflaborunits" who accompany the armed forces q ual ify 
for prisoner-of.war status, few if any detaining powers would be likely to afford combatant im· 
m unity in the event they took a direct part in hostilities. 1949 Geneva Convention III , supra note 
3, art. 4.A(4). This view accords with the inclusion of these groups in the law-of-war definition of 
civilian. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 50. 
32. Writers have adopted the term "fighters" to describe persons taking direct part in NIAC 
hostilities, whether government or rebel. See, e.g., MICHAEL N. SCHMITT, CHARLES H.B. 
GARRAWAY & YORAM DINSTEIN, THE MANUAL ON THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED 
CONFlICf WITH COMMENTARY 1 LL2 (2006) [hereinafter NIAC MANUAL]; I CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw rule 6 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck 
eels., 2005) (omitt ing entirely reference 10 non-international armed conflict in rules governing 
"Combatants and Prisoners-of-War") [hereinafter CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANI· 
TARIAN LAW] . 
33. See NIAC MANUAL, supra note 32, 3.6 (outlin ing minimal prolections afforded to 
"[p]ersons whose liberty has been restricted"); UK LOAC MANUAL, supra note 27, 15.6.3; Mi· 
chael N. Schmitt, The Status ofOpfX1sition Fighters iTI a Non-International Armed Conflict, which 
is Chapter VI in th is volume, at 119. 
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34. See UK LOAC MANUAL, supra note 27, 15.34-15.56 (reviewing rules added to the law 
of NIAC by Protocol II without mention of prisoner·of-war status). 
35. Additional Protocol II , supra note 17, art. 5. Article 6 echoes th is reluctance, referring to 
"those deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict. n Id., art. 6. 
36. See 1949 Geneva Convention Ill , supra note 3, art. 3; Additional Protocol II , supra note 
17, art. 5. An increasing n umber of international lawyers view international human rights law 
(IHRL) as applicable or at least complementary to the law o f war. See RENE PROVOST, 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAw (2002); Fran~ise 1- Hampson, The 
Reiatiornhip between IntenuHional Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law from the Perspec-
tiveofa Human Rights Treaty Body, 90 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 549 (2008); 
Cordula Droege, Elective Affinities? Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, 90 INTERNATIONAL 
REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 501 (2008); Dietrich Schindler, Human Rights arId Humanitarian 
Law, 31 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAw REVIEW 935 (1982). Particularly given the terri torial 
nature ofN IAC, many would regard IHRLas a source of treatment obligations in NIAC. None· 
theless, this chapter focuses exclusively on protections derived from the law of war. 
37. By comparison, in lAC anned groups not part of States' regular anned forces can gain 
prisoner-of-war status for their members by complying with criteria enumerated in the Third 
Geneva Convention: belonging to a party, submitting to a command hierarchy, bearing arms 
openly, wearing distinctive insignia and observing the laws of war. See 1949 Geneva Convention 
III , supra note 3, art. 4.A(2). 
38. See EVE LA HA YE, WAR CRIMES IN INTERNAL ARMED CONFllCTS ch. 5, 256-70 (2008) 
(outJ ining domestic p rosecutions arising from NlACs); NlAC MANUAL, supra note 32, 1 3.7 
(outJining d ue process obligations applicable to domestic prosecution for "crime[s[ related to 
the hostilities"); THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 1 1202.3 (Dieter 
Flecked., 2008) (noting States' interest in prosecution of insurgents' acts of murder and destruc-
tion in NIAC) [hereinafter HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW[ . 
39. Additional Protocol II , supra note 17, art. 6(5). Commentary interprets the clause as in· 
tended to promote general reconciliation rather than to recognize or effectuate any right to im· 
m uni ty or amnesty held by captured fighters. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITlONAL PROTOCOLS 
OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 1402 (Yves Sandoz, 
Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmennann eds., 1987) [hereinaft er COMMENTARY ON THE 
ADDITlONAL PROTOCOLS] . 
40. The most widely applicable standard for combatant status is found among select provi. 
sions of the Third Geneva Convention's categories of prisoner of war. In an ironic twist, the 
LOAC defini tion of civilian identifies four categories of prisoner of war as constituting the com· 
batant class in lAC. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art . 50. For its States parties, Addi-
tional Protocol I refines in Articles 43 and 44 the criteria for combatant status. Combatant status 
under Protocol I is commonly understood to require only affiliation with an anned force or 
group which employs a system of discipline enforcing compliance with LOAC and carrying 
one's arms openly in attack. See id. The Protocol's elimination of the criterion of distinctive in-
signia or a unifonn has been widely criticized. See Douglas Fei th, Law in the Service of Terror-
The Strange Case of Additi011al Protocol I, I THE NATIONAL INTEREST 36 (1985); Guy B. Roberts, 
The Nf!W Rules for Waging War: The Case Against Ratification of Additional Protocol I, 26 
VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 109 ( 1985); Abraham Sofaer, Terrorism and the 
Law, 64 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 901 (1986). Although a persistent objector to some of Additional Pro· 
tocol I, the United States regards significant portions of the Protocol as reflective of customary 
law. See Memorandum from W. Hayes Parks eI al. to Mr. John H. McNeill, Assistant General 
Counsel, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 19n Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions: 
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Customary International Law Im plications (May 9, 1986), reprinted in THE JUDGE ADVOCATE 
GENERAL'S LEGAL CENTER & SCHOOL, LAW OF WAR DocUMENTARY SUPPLEMENT 388, 389 
(Sean Watts ed., 20(6); Michael J. Matheson, Remarks in Session One: The United States Position 
on theRe/arion ofCustomnry lntemntionnl Law to tire 1977 ProtocoIsAdditiorral to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, 2 AMERICAN UNIVERSIIT JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLICY 419, 425 
(1987). 
41. UK LOAC MANUAL, supra note 27, ch. 15; OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAl, 
CHIEF Of DEfENCE STAfF, JOINT DocrRlNE MANUAL, LAw Of ARMED CONfLlCf AT THE 
OPERATIONAL AND TACflCAL LEVELS ch. 17 (2001) [hereinafter CANADIAN LOAC MANUALJ. 
The German law of armed conflict manual does not treat NlAC in detail. See FEDERAL MINISTRY 
OF DEFENCE, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, HUMANITARES VOLK£RRECHT IN BEWAFFNETEN 
KONFLlKTEN- HANDBUCH 210-11 (1992). The manual simplyinstruclS German armed forces 
to apply "fundamental humani tarian provisions of international law embodied in the four 
1949 Geneva Conventions (Common Art. 3), the 1954 Cul tural Property Convention (Art. 19) 
and the 1977 Additional Protocol I I ~ to NlAC. [d., 211 . Comments by a prominent German 
legal expert note tha t the In ternational Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia inter· 
preted this paragraph as a statement equating the law of lAC and NIAC. WolffHeintschel von 
Heinegg, TIle Germarr Man ual, in INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, FORUM FOR 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL AND HUMANrrARlAN LAW, NATIONAL MlUTARY MANUALS ON THE 
LAW Of ARMED CONFUCf 112 (Nobuo Hayash i ed., 2d ed. 2010), aVtli/ab/e at http:// 
www.fichl.orgipublication·series(citing lnternationalCriminal Tribunal for the fonner Yugo. 
slavia, Tadic Jurisdiction Decision1 118). The UK Manual on the Law of Armed Conflict includes an 
interesting historical notation regarding French practice in Algeria. Wh ile French forces 
unsurprisingly tried and executed Algerian rebels without according prisoner-of-war status, the 
French also expected opposition fighters to accord prisoner-of-war status to captured French 
soldiers. UK LOAC MANUAL, supra, 1 15.4.1 n.21 . The current U.S.law-of-war manual includes 
only a single paragraph on "civil war,~ the bulk of which merely reprints Common Article 3 of 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Department of the Army, FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare 
1 11 (1956). A closely held draft of a new U.s. manual is currently under review by executive 
branch agencies. 
42. UK LOAC MANUAL, suprn note 27, 15.6.1; CANADIAN LOAC MANUAL, supra note 41, 
11706.1. 
43. U.N. Charter art. 2(7). Article 2(7) states, uNothing in the present Charter shall autho· 
rize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic juris· 
diction of any state . .. . n Id. 
44. See UK LOAC MANUAL, supra note 27, 1 15.6.1. 
45. A prominent law-of-war handbook asserts, U A1lstates have lega] frameworks which priv. 
ilege their own police and armed forces as against insurgents who oppose them." HAND8ooKOF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, suprn note 38, 1 1202.2. Title 10 of the United States 
Code provides legal authority for and organizes the U.s. armed forces. Title 50 organizes em· 
ployees of U.S. federal inteUigence agencies. Recent operations, particularly those carried o ut 
against global terrorist networks, have blurred the lines of authority between Title 10 and Ti tle 50 
agencies. Debate has also developed over other agencies' participation in national security activi· 
ties, such as the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency's work in counterterrorism operations. See 
Johnny Dwyer, The DEA. 's Terrorist Hunters: Overreaching Their Authority?, TIME-COM (Aug. 8, 
2011), http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0.8599.2087220.00.html. 
46. See James Glanz & Alissa J. Rubin, From Errand to Fa tal Shot to Hail of Fire to J 7 Deaths, 
NEW YORK TIMES, Oct. 3, 2007 at AI. 
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47. See Moshe Schwartz, Congressional Research Service, The DepartmentofDefense's US€of 
Private &curity Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background, Analysis, and Options for Con-
gress (2011 ). 
48. Several international criminal tribunals wield jurisdiction over the conduct ofNlAC. See 
e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(c)-(f), July 17, 1998,2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 (amended Jan. 16,2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute] . 
49. See GENEVA CONVENTION IV COMMENTARY, supra note 14, at 35. 
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the Armed Forces, 57 AIR FORCE LAW REVIEW 155 (2005); Michael N. Schmitt, Wired Warfare: 
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INTERNATIONAL LAW 187, 198 (Michael N. Schmitt & Brian T. O'Donnell eds., 2002) (VoL 76, 
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51. See W. Hays Parks, Special Forces' WearofNon-Standard Uniforms, 4 CHICAGO JOURNAL 
OF INTERNATtONAlLAW 493, SOS-11 (2003) (discussing the criteria (or prisoner-of-war status 
and distinguishing entitlement to or loss of status from criminality). 
52. LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 253 (1968) (observing thaI Hmost states obey 
most iaw most of the time"). 
53. See Sean Watts, Reciprocity and the Law of War, 50 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAw 
JOURNAL 365 (2009). 
54. Adam Roberts, The Equal Application of the Laws of War: A Principle ullder PTessure, 90 
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 931 (2008). 
55. SeeGENEVA CONVENTION IV COMMENTARY, supra note 14, at 6-7. Jean Pictet observes, 
"Without [the guarantee] neither Article 3, nor any other Article in its place, would ever have 
been adopted." Id. at 44. 
56. See 1949 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 3, art. 3. 
57. See Waldemar Solf, The Status ofCombatallts ill Non-Illternational Armed Conflicts un-
der Domestic Law and Transllational Practice, 33 AM.ERlCAN UNIVERSITY LAw REVIEW 53, 57-58 
(1983) (tracing recognition of combatant status to Belli, Grotius, Pufendorf and Vanel). 
58. Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 51(3). Article 51(3) states. "Civil ians shall enjoy 
the protection afforded by this section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in 
hostili ties." 
59. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 39, at 514. 
60. See DIN STEIN, supra note 19, at 33 (noting lawful combatants' Klicense to kill" ). 
61. Early commentators viewed skeptically claims that intemational law could authorize or 
"give positive sanction to" States to do anything. 2 JOHN WFSfUKf., INTERNATIONAL LAW 52 
(1907) (explaining that rules of war "are always restrictive, never permissive"). See alro Roberts, 
supra note 54, at 935 (rejecting that international law grants belligerents the "right" to participate 
in hostilities); Baxter, supra note 25, at 323-324 (arguing, wi th characteristic prescience, a simi· 
lar point prior 10 the codification of Additional Protocol I). 
62. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1,30-31 (1942) (finding in international laws of war 
support for the concept of unlawful combatancy); Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 
U.S.c. § 950t( 15) (2009) (defining, for p urposes of U.S. military commissions, the crime of 




63. See George J. Andreopoulos, TIle Age of National Liberation Movements, in THE LAWS 
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at 193. 
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